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Abstract
This paper provides a systematic review of the empirical literature based on the major top-
ics that have been associated with the market for cryptocurrencies since their development
as a financial asset in 2009. Despite astonishing price appreciation in recent years, cryp-
tocurrencies have been subjected to accusations of pricing bubbles central to the trilemma
that exists between regulatory oversight, the potential for illicit use through its anonymity
within a young under-developed exchange system, and infrastructural breaches influenced
by the growth of cybercriminality. Each influence the perception of the role of cryptocur-
rencies as a credible investment asset class and legitimate of value.
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1. Introduction
Cryptocurrencies have attracted significant attention from investors, regulators and
the media since Bitcoin was first proposed by Nakamoto [2008]. Cryptocurrencies are
peer-to-peer electronic cash systems which allow online payments to be sent directly from
one party to another without going through a financial institution. Therefore, unlike the
vast majority of other financial assets available, they have no association with any higher
authority, have no physical representation and are infinitely divisible. Also unlike traditional
financial assets, the value of cryptocurrencies are not based on any tangible asset, a countries
economy or a firm, but instead are based on the security of an algorithm which is able to
trace all transaction. The growth of the use of cryptocurrencies can be linked to their
low transaction costs, peer-to-peer system, and governmental free design. This has led to
a surge in trading volume, volatility and price of cryptocurrencies, with cryptocurrencies
regularly in the mainstream news.
Bitcoin is the first decentralised digital currency and remains the cryptocurrency mar-
ket’s leader. For the period from October 2016 to October 2017 the market capitalisation of
the Bitcoin increased from $10.1 to $79.7 billion, while the price jumped from $616 to $4800
(US dollars). This significant growth presented an opportunity to obtain 680% of return
on investments per year, which cannot be offered by any other assets. In December 2017
the price per Bitcoin reached $19,500. As the blockchain space matures, Bitcoin will expe-
rience the increased competition in the nearest future (Corbet et al. [2018b]). Today, there
are more than one thousand cryptocurrencies, including new products such as Ethereum,
Ripple, Litecoin and Dash, who have contributed to a total market capitalisation of almost
$190 billion.
Due to the popularity of cryptocurrencies amongst users, they have attracted substantial
media attention while becoming a popular topic in recent academic research. While new
empirical evidence continues to emerge at a rapid pace, there is a strong need to aggregate
the existing knowledge in cryptocurrency research and identify the gaps in the existing
literature. This paper provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the major
topics that have attracted the attention of scholars. Our motivation to employ a systematic
analysis in this study is threefold.
First, this paper is motivated by the growing amount of academic literature analysing
a variety of issues associated with the rapid growth of cryptocurrency markets. Many
scholars simultaneously attempt to address common research questions taken from a broad
tradition of financial research, such as those based around market efficiency, asset pricing
bubbles, contagion and decoupling hypotheses, volatility clustering, and the impact of news
announcements and media attention (Corbet et al. [2017]), to name but a few. Many studies
are conducted in parallel utilising similar datasets and employing similar methodologies
consequently providing identical evidence. Besides, due to the urgency of these research
problems, many papers are published in the form of short research notes, which makes
it even more important for financial scholars to ensure that their research findings are
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distinctive. Therefore it is crucial to review the existing papers in this research field and
to identify a current threshold of the academic quality of the studies that consider the
challenges and opportunities surrounding cryptocurrencies.
Second, our study is motivated by a relative dearth of systematic literature reviews
in finance. While systematic reviews become very popular in medical science, psychology,
neuroscience, as well as in economics, international business and management, in finance
the preference was given to more narrative literature surveys (for example, O’Connor et al.
[2015]; Vigne et al. [2017]). Systematic analysis approaches can provide a more compre-
hensive understanding of the knowledge in the field, and the findings can change future
directions of the research in this discipline by uncovering gaps in the literature. For new re-
search areas such as those based around cryptocurrencies, a systematic analysis can be the
most powerful tool to inform academics, professionals and policy-makers about the current
state of knowledge, consensuses and ambiguities in the emerging discipline.
Thirdly, this review is motivated by the problem of paradigmatic unity in finance re-
search highlighted by Lagoarde-Segot [2015]. The majority of financial papers are con-
ducted in broad traditions of positivist research, however, often the research questions that
are important for practitioners and policy-makers rely beyond this philosophical paradigm.
Cryptocurrency finance research immediately adopted the same pattern. However, in cryp-
tocurrencies, apart from standard financial problems mentioned above, there are several
unique and specific issues that cannot be addressed directly using quantitative research
design and data mining. For example, regulatory disorientation, cybercriminality, environ-
mental sustainability, to name but a few. In this paper, we provide recommendations of how
cryptocurrency research can be diversified in order to provide more meaningful contribu-
tions to knowledge. It is important to generate the research findings that can be useful for
policy-makers, businesses, society, and can be disseminated and replicated by the scholars
outside of the financial community.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the evolution
of cryptocurrencies and the asset class Trilemma, focusing on the potential presence of
pricing bubbles, the potential for regulatory disorientation and the growth of cryptocurrency
cybercriminality. Section 3 discusses the development of cryptocurrency markets with an
emphasis on the diversification benefits and market efficiency. Section 4 investigates unique
issues related to cryptocurrencies, discussing sustainability and market correlations while
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The evolution of cryptocurrencies and the Asset Class Trilemma
The evolution of cryptocurrencies has merited the attention of academics, policy-makers
and regulators alike since the evolution of Bitcoin almost a decade ago. Cryptocurrency
advocates believe that there is evidence to support the asset’s continued evolution as a
cashless medium of exchange that can potentially change the world of finance as we know
it. Opponents to the evolution of cryptocurrencies identify the role of cybercriminality and
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the unknown destabilising effects on world economies as some of the potential pitfalls of
their evolution. We set out to identify these key areas of cryptocurrency research. Ninety
separate research papers are included in this cryptocurrency analysis. Only two included
papers were available before 2013, with only seven more being published in 2014. In 2015,
eleven papers were published on the topic of cryptocurrencies, with thirteen in 2016 and
thirty in 2017. At the time of writing, in 2018 there were twenty-seven papers available
with significant citation available. These statistics present evidence of the strong evolution
of cryptocurrency research in recent years. Table 1 identifies the key characteristics of
the included explanatory and literature review based research that we have incorporated.
Thirty-two papers are included, spanning the period between 2011 and 2018. We have
divided the research arguments into five distinct areas: 1) Bubble dynamics; 2) Regulation;
3) Cybercriminality; 4) Diversification; and 5) Efficiency. Each of these areas is distinctly
investigated in this paper.
Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here
Table 2 identifies the key characteristics of the fifty-two quantitative investigations of
cryptocurrency markets. The research papers are sub-categorised in the same manner with
data reported to include the dependent variable of the investigated methodology and indeed
the type of methodology used, the rationale behind its use, the frequency and source the
data used, the selected control variables and the number of observations. Figure 1 presents
evidence of the duration of data coverage for the incorporated quantitative cryptocurrency
research. As cryptocurrency research continues to develop, we observe that there are rela-
tively few papers that have utilised cryptocurrency data for the entire period incorporating
2009. Much of the data possesses a starting point in 2010. While thirteen papers are
directly identified as theoretical, the most common type of methodology used is that of
ordinary least squares regression modelling, which has been selected by ten methodolo-
gies. Volatility methodologies such as ARCH and GARCH account for nine methodologies,
with the next most common groupings incorporating a network analysis or Hurst exponent
analysis. Figure 2 presents an analysis of the frequency of cryptocurrency selection as the
central topic of investigation in the papers that we have analysed. Bitcoin represents the
central cryptocurrency in 74.3% of the papers included. There is evidence of clear under-
analysis of a number of important cryptocurrencies. Table 3 presents the core research
topics of the included papers with the underlying structure of cryptocurrencies the most
frequent research topic. Price dynamics is the next most popular research area with related
diversification benefits, market regulation and the effects of cybercriminality presenting the
following areas of frequent research. Table 4 presents evidence of the data sources used
by the selected research included in our paper. Bitcoincharts.com and Coindesk.com are
denoted as the two most common data sources cited in papers related to cryptocurrencies.
5
Insert Figure 1 and 2 and Tables 3 & 4 about here
2.1. The cryptocurrency asset class trilemma
The evolution of the price of Bitcoin, as presented in Figure 3, generated substantial
worldwide attention towards cryptocurrencies. The asset’s proponents continued to point
to the potential economic benefits that could be achieved, with the price of Bitcoin often
increasing and decreasing by over 10%. Widespread warnings were made by market com-
mentators1, academics, regulators and policy-makers alike, concerned with the potential for
an inherent bubble within cryptocurrencies. Wide-ranging arguments have been developed,
however, while considering the arguments proposed by proponents and opponents alike, the
sharp increase in the price of Bitcoin has been described to contain bubble-like properties
(Corbet et al. [2017]) with further fears stoked by the speed to which it has occurred. We
consider the relevant literature in due course but identify the potential for inherent pricing
bubbles as one of the key economic risks central to the existence of cryptocurrencies at
large.
Insert Figures 2 & 3 about here
Within the substantial price inflation of these new digital assets, contains inherent
episodes of extreme volatility. This price volatility is often witnessed in the time periods
surrounding two distinct undesirable features that have been predominantly associated with
cryptocurrencies: 1) regulatory disorientation; and 2) cybercriminality. These two features
complete the asset class trilemma that is presented in Figure 4. This trilemma develops
on the three key interrelated issues that cryptocurrencies must be overcome and are each
considered in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. While there have been substantial de-
clines in the price of Bitcoin associated with rumours of regulatory imposition, even the
widespread banning of cryptocurrencies in some jurisdictions, the easing of such regulatory
pressures should theoretically generate substantial price appreciation. Further, the growth
of significant episodes of cybercrime continues to undermine confidence and stability in the
cryptocurrency market with significant consequences (Gandal et al. [2018]; Lucey et al.
[2018]). However, the presence of inherent pricing bubbles (as found by Cheah and Fry
[2015]; Corbet et al. [2018a]) generate substantial rewards for those who wish to profit
from such illicit tactics as cryptocurrency market hacking and theft. Growth in cybercrime
also generates an immediate need for improved international regulatory alignment (Viglione
[2015]), but it is also associated with the widespread banning of such financial instruments
1In an interview with Business Insider on 27 February 2018, the chief investment officer of the Investment
Strategy Group of Goldman Sachs stated that cryptocurrencies at large are in a bubble and ‘when it bursts,
will impact only 1 percent of global GDP’
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in some jurisdictions, therefore further misalignment of the international regulatory ap-
proach. While considering the substantial number of issues that are directly associated
with the structure, theoretical underpinnings of cryptocurrencies and broad market dy-
namics, research to date has mostly focused on the elements of the stated trilemma as a
priority.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Regulation is one of the key factors affecting the price of cryptocurrencies, with a sin-
gular, sharp reduction in the price of Bitcoin by almost 50% in early 2018 being widely
attributed to government actions in South Korea and China2. Within their own structure,
cryptocurrencies are not domiciled in any single country’s borders, which inherently is one
of the key problems when attempting to define regulatory alignment. For example, in the
United States the CFTC3 treats Bitcoin as a commodity while the IRS4 treats the same
product as property. There is further evidence of broad disparity of regulation when inves-
tigating Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and the underlying tokens being traded on exchanges,
with some tokens, escaping SEC disclosure regulations as they do not explicitly represent
equity or a share in a company. Should regulation be introduced in one jurisdiction, cryp-
tocurrency’s inherent international features enable an ICO to simply take place in a state
where regulatory alignment takes place. In March 2018, the SEC issued dozens of subpoe-
nas information requests to companies and advisor’s centred on ICOs and the structure of
the sales.
Another major regulatory issue is the speed of cryptocurrency evolution. As cryptocur-
rencies develop, broad regulation is not developing in tandem, however, countries such as
2In January 2018, it was widely reported that finance regulators in South Korea were looking to coop-
erate with authorities in China and Japan on new rules for cryptocurrency trading. A Jan. 8 report by
Yonhap News states that representatives from the Korean Financial Services Commission (FSC), as well
as those from the relevant agencies in Japan and China, met in December 2017 to discuss the oversight
of cryptocurrency investment. After this subsequent news release, cryptocurrency prices fell with Bitcoin
experiencing losses in excess of 50% in one month.
3The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an independent agency of the US gov-
ernment created in 1974, that regulates futures and option markets. The stated mission of the CFTC
is to foster open, transparent, competitive, and financially sound markets, to avoid systemic risk, and to
protect the market users and their funds, consumers, and the public from fraud, manipulation, and abusive
practices related to derivatives and other products that are subject to the Commodity Exchange Act. After
the Financial crisis of 2007-08 and since 2010 with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, CFTC has been transitioning to bring more transparency and stricter regulation to the
multi-trillion dollar swaps market.
4The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the revenue service of the United States federal government. The
government agency is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, and is under the immediate direction of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who is appointed to a five-year term by the President of the United
States.
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South Africa and their Reserve Bank have taken a ‘sandbox’ approach to regulation which
attempts to mitigate inherent pitfalls without stifling their development. A further major
issue surrounds that of anonymity, which must be addressed to undermine issues such as
money-laundering and general misappropriation of funds, particularly when considering the
ease of cross-border transfer of cryptocurrencies. This regulation vacuum has deterred some
major banking corporations from conducting business with cryptocurrency traders, further
undermining the reputation of the new financial products.
In January 2018, confidence in broad cryptocurrency exchanges was dealt a significant
blow due to hacking of $530 million from Coincheck, eclipsing the prior record of $400
million reported to have been stolen from the Mt.Gox hacking event in 2014. The hackers
had stolen customer deposits of NEM, which then fell approximately 20% as news broke
to the public about the hack. This followed the closure of South Korean Bitcoin exchange
Youbit who recently filed for bankruptcy after being the target of two significant hacking
events in quick succession. In December 2017, hackers stole approximately $70 million worth
of Bitcoin from NiceHash which is a digital currency trading platform based in Slovenia.
Such events have created further focus and desire for the regulation of the entire industry,
but this has simultaneously been associated with widespread price volatility. There has
been further cybercriminality detected with regards to the hacking of internet-connected
devices in an attempt to utilise computing power to mine digital coins such as Monero5.
2.2. Do cryptocurrencies possess inherent pricing bubbles?
One of the most immediate issues for cryptocurrencies at large is the potential existence
of an inherent pricing bubble. Corbet et al. [2017] built on the work of Phillips et al. [2011]
and Phillips et al. [2015] to examine the existence and dates of potential pricing bubbles
in the markets for Bitcoin and Ethereum. Having derived ratios based on fundamental
drivers using data from 2009 to 2017, the author’s present evidence that Bitcoin was almost
certainly in a bubble phase in late 2017. This echoed the findings of Cheung et al. [2015]
who focused on the collapse of Bitcoin’s largest exchange Mt. Gox6 to identify numerous
5Monero (XMR) is an open-source cryptocurrency created in April 2014 that focuses on privacy and
decentralization that runs on Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, and FreeBSD. Monero uses a public ledger
to record transactions while new units are created through a process called mining. Monero aims to improve
on existing cryptocurrency design by obscuring sender, recipient and amount of every transaction made as
well as making the mining process more egalitarian. The focus on privacy has attracted illicit use by people
interested in evading law enforcement. The egalitarian mining process made it viable to distribute the
mining effort opening new funding avenues for both legitimate online publishers and malicious hackers who
covertly embed mining code into websites and apps.
6Mt.Gox was a Bitcoin exchange based Tokyo, Japan which launched in July 2010 and by 2013 it
was handling over 70% of all Bitcoin transactions worldwide, as the largest Bitcoin intermediary and the
world’s leading Bitcoin exchange. However, in February 2014, Mt.Gox suspended trading, closed its website
and exchange service, and filed for bankruptcy protection from creditors. In April 2014, the company
began liquidation proceedings. Mt.Gox then announced that approximately 850,000 Bitcoins belonging to
customers and the company were missing and likely stolen, an amount valued at more than $450 million at
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short-lived bubbles over the period 2010 through 2014. They specifically identify three
very large bubbles in the latter part of their sample lasting from 66-106 days. The final
bubble that they identify is described as being that which ‘broke the camels back’ and
caused the demise of Mt.Gox. Cheah and Fry [2015] found that Bitcoin exhibits speculative
bubbles with further empirical evidence provided that the fundamental price of Bitcoin is
zero. The author’s further note that Bitcoin seems to behave more like an asset than a
currency, with the main attraction appearing to be sourced in it’s role as a speculative asset
instead of functioning as money, particularly as 70% of existing Bitcoins are held in dormant
accounts (Weber [2014]). Fry and Cheah [2016] test the existence of bubbles using data from
2011 through 2015 using a multivariate methodology. Drawing from statistical physics and
mathematics, the authors find evidence for a negative bubble from 2014 onwards in the two
largest cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ripple. Evidence also suggests that there is a spillover
from Ripple to Bitcoin that exacerbates price decreases in the latter, with Ripple being the
most over-priced of the two. Baek and Elbeck [2015] use the S&P500 to examine relative
volatility with Bitcoin using de-trended ratios to find that Bitcoin is internally driven by
buyers and sellers, therefore concluding that the Bitcoin market is highly speculative.
Blau [2018] investigated the volatility of Bitcoin across time while testing as to whether
the unusual level of the product’s volatility is attributed to speculative trading. Using data
based on the period July 2010 through June 2014, it is found that this speculative trading
did not have any relationship with the 2013 price increases nor the dramatic increases in
volatility. Gkillas and Katsiampa [2018] study the tail behaviour of the returns of five
major cryptocurrencies using Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall to find that Bitcoin
Cash7 is the riskiest cyrptocurrency, while Bitcoin and Litecoin are the least risky. Peng
et al. [2018] provide an evaluation of the predictive performances of the volatility of cryt-
pocurrencies using daily and hourly-frequency data to find that the Support Vector Regres-
sion (SVR)-GARCH methodology managed to outperform that of GARCH, EGARCH and
GJR-GARCH models with Normal, Student’s t and Skewed Student’s t distributions. The
predictive ability of their models was evaluated using the Diebold-Mariano test (Diebold
and Mariano [2002]) and Hansen’s Model Confidence Set Hansen et al. [2011]. Phillip
et al. [2018] used a cross-section analysis of 224 different cryptocurrencies to identify sev-
eral unique properties including leverage effects and Student t error distributions. Jang and
Lee [2017] use Bayesian Neural Networks (BNN) while incorporating the the underlying fun-
damentals of Bitcoin to present evidence of a well-performed predictor of Bitcoin price time
series while explaining the high volatility of Bitcoin in recent times. While Polasik et al.
[2015] look at country, customer and company-specific characteristics interactions with the
proportion of sales attributed to Bitcoin, the underlying fundamentals are of considerable
the time.
7Bitcoin Cash (BCH) is a hard fork of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. The Bitcoin scalability debate led to
the hard fork on 1 August 2017, which resulted in the creation of a new blockchain.
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interest when attempting to monitor potential bubbles in the market for cryptocurrencies,
particularly issues such as power consumption and mining expense. Vranken [2017] esti-
mated that the order of magnitude for energy consumption is 100MW, therefore, as Bitcoin
becomes more popular the effort for Bitcoin mining becomes substantially more difficult,
leading to the sole survival of those miners that possess the most competitive mining equip-
ment with access to the cheapest electricity costs. This shifting economic structure could
potential generate monopolistic pricing influences.
Fry [2018] introduced a rational bubble model for Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
that combines both heavy tails and the probability of a complete collapse in asset prices
which makes this model a theoretical refinement of the model by Cheah and Fry [2015].
In the absence of the central cryptocurrency market regulation the possibility that whole
market can collapse is higher for cryptocurrencies than for other assets. The paper provides
evidence of a bubble in Bitcoin and Ethereum, while no evidence of a bubble in Ripple.
Bouri et al. [2018] analysed price explosivity of 7 largest cryptocurrencies by market cap-
italisation using daily data from August 7, 2015 to December 31, 2017. The results show
that all cryptocurrencies in the sample (Bitcoin, Ripple, Ethereum, Litecoin, Nem, Dash,
and Stellar) experienced explosive behaviours in multiple periods. Furthermore, the study
provides evidence of a multidirectional co-explosivity behaviour, i.e. explosivity in one
cryptocurrency can lead to explosivity in other cryptocurrencies, while this effect does not
necessarily depend on the size of each cryptocurrency.
Investor attention is also observed as a key determinant of potential market mis-pricing
as discussed in Shiller [2000], Baker and Wurgler [2007] and Andrei and Hasler [2014]. Using
a VECM methodology, Mai et al. [2015] found that social media effects are mostly driven
by those who use social media less often, otherwise known as the silent majority. Further,
messages on internet forums are found to have stronger impacts on Bitcoin returns relative
to tweets. Through the use of a significant database spanning 2010 through 2017, Urquhart
[2018] found that realised volatility and the volume of Bitcoin traded, controlled for Bitcoin
fundamentals, are both significant drivers of the next day’s attention for Bitcoin. Balcilar
et al. [2017] show that volume cannot help to predict the volatility of Bitcoin returns at any
point of the conditional distribution, but can predict returns with the exception of Bitcoin,
bull and bear market regimes.
2.3. Regulatory disorientation
The regulation of cryptocurrencies presents both a unique and monumental challenge to
policy-makers. Many countries have threatened to introduce blanket-bans against the use
and trading of cryptocurrencies, but few have yet to introduce such regulation. In late-2017
and early-2018 the widespread threat of regulatory intervention by countries such as South
Korea and China was widely attributed to a substantial decrease in the value of Bitcoin. In
January 2018, the South Korean Financial Services Commission introduced measures to ban
anonymous trading on domestic exchanges, while foreigners and minors would be completely
banned from trading through cryptocurrency accounts. Chinese regulators have sought to
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increase regulation banning initial coin offerings (ICOs), the supervision of foreign currency
flows and increasing transparency within cryptocurrency exchanges. Potential inter-linkage
between Bitcoin and issues such as, but not limited to, the funding of terrorism, the potential
for money substitution and the potential for tax-evasion and cross-border wealth transfer
have led to blanket and partial bank in Thailand and China (2013); Russia, Vietnam,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan and Bangladesh (2014); Taiwan (2015); Columbia (2016);
and Nigeria (2017). In addition, social media platform Facebook in 2018 introduced an
advertising policy that prohibits advertisement pertaining to cryptocurrency, binary options
and ICOs. The policy was introduced as part of an ongoing effort to improve the integrity
and security of Facebook advertisement while simultaneously making it more difficult for
fraudsters to generate illegal profit from vulnerable social media users. Cryptocurrencies
had provided a perfect medium from which this form of fraud could thrive.
Brito et al. [2014] state that while Bitcoin-related regulation has been largely focused
on customer-based anti-money laundering regulation, the authors find that financial regu-
lators should consider exempting or excluding certain financial transactions denominated in
Bitcoin from the full scope of the regulations, similar to that of private securities offerings
and forward contracts to encourage resilience and adoption and to ensure that regulatory
costs do not eventually outweigh the benefits of cryptocurrencies. Hendrickson and Luther
[2017] employ a monetary model with endogenous search and random consumption pref-
erences to consider the extent to which a government can ban a cryptocurrency to show
that this can be achieved without a reliance on punishments but is dependent on the size
of the government. Böhme et al. [2015], while focusing on the governance of Bitcoin note
that although its design originally set out to provide a service, new constituent are now
being added but it is not clear if they aspire to meet prevailing requirements. While the
underlying foundations of Bitcoin appear to be locked in place, there are numerous com-
peting virtual currencies that can act as a ready replacement. Atzori [2015] advocates
the role of the State as a necessary central point of coordination in society, showing that
decentralisation through algorithm-based consensus is an organisational theory, but not a
stand-alone political theory. The authors highlight key risks related to a dominant position
of private powers in distributed econosystems. Rohr and Wright [2017] argues that the SEC
and Congress should provide token sellers and the exchanges that facilitate token sales with
additional certainty while providing guidance on how the Howey test8 should be applied to
digital tokens. In support of lighter regulation, Luther and Salter [2017] found that down-
loads for fifteen Bitcoin apps available at the time of the bailout in Cyprus increased in
the aftermath of its announcement. However, the authors state that the increased number
of downloads was not especially pronounced in countries identified as having a troubled
8The Howey Test is a test created by the Supreme Court for determining whether certain transactions
qualify as investment contracts. If so, then under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, those transactions are considered securities and therefore subject to certain disclosure and
registration requirements.
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banking system.
Regulatory issues are not confined to money-laundering aspects and as to whether the
costs of cryptocurrency barriers could hinder the potential benefits. Marian [2013] and
Gross et al. [2017] focus on the taxation implications of cryptocurrencies with the provi-
sion of a specific warning that even though Bitcoin and broad cryptocurrencies exist in a
digital form, we cannot assume that their influence will be solely digital. Their use can
theoretically generate effects within the real economy. Further, their existence needs inter-
national consideration as to whether they should be treated as currency or property and
whether they are subject to capital gains and losses regulations9. The tax treatment of
broad cryptocurrencies is further driven by its financial status. Grinberg [2012] focused
on the potential for separation of Bitcoin from it’s legal ‘grey area’ with identification of
it’s potential inclusion in general anti-fraud legislation should it be considered a security in
the future. Tasca et al. [2016] utilise a network analysis to map payment relationships in
an attempt to analyse transaction behaviour segregated by business category. They show
that the market has matured in three stages: 1) an early prototype stage; 2) a second
stage interlinked with ‘sin’ products and enterprises; and 3) a third stage marked with a
progression towards legitimate enterprise. This provides evidence of an evolution of the
cryptocurrency market.
Savelyev [2017] investigate copyright in the blockchain era to point out that blockchain
could offer potential transparency advantages in the area, particularly around piracy of
digital content and the protection of revenue streams through cryptocurrency payments and
smart contracts, however, many of the legal aspects of blockchain need to be immediately
considered. Bollen [2013] note that there are significant legal issues surrounding the fact
that Bitcoin does not have an issues but this should not cause regulatory issues.
With regards to the regulation of price dynamics, Gandal et al. [2018] investigate the
impact of suspicious trading activity on the Mt.Gox currency exchange during it’s demise
in 2013. Based on a rigorous analysis with extensive robustness checks the authors demon-
strate that during periods identified as ‘suspicious’, this trading activity is found to have
likely caused the unprecedented increase in te US dollar-Bitcoin (USD-BTC) exchange rate
in late 2013 when it increased from around $150 to more than $1,000 in two months.
Viglione [2015] investigated the effects of social technologies related to the governance on
cross-country differences in Bitcoin prices as controlled for financial freedom, to which a
9For example, in the United State if you spend or invest in virtual currencies, it is crucial to understand
how virtual currency transactions are treated for tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ad-
dressed the taxation of virtual currency transactions in Notice 2014-21. According to the Notice, virtual
currency is treated as property for federal tax purposes. This means that, depending on the taxpayer’s
circumstances, cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, can be classified as business property, investment prop-
erty, or personal property. General tax principles applicable to property transactions must be applied to
exchanges of cryptocurrencies. Hence, Notice 2014-21 holds that taxpayers recognize gain or loss on the
exchange of cryptocurrency for other property. Accordingly, gains or losses are recognised every time that
Bitcoin is used to purchase goods or services.
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positive correlation is found. Bitcoin is therefore observed as a new channel that can offer
evasion of domestic jurisdiction. Dwyer [2015] explains how the use of peer-to-peer net-
works and open source software combined with the limitation of quantity produced creates
an equilibrium in which a cryptocurrency has a positive value. The use of such technology
is designed to prevent users from spending their balances more than once, also known as
the double-spending problem10.
2.4. The growth of cryptocurrency cybercriminality
To complete the trilemma we focus on that of cybercriminality, which is found to take
two broad forms: 1) Cybercrime stemming from the use of cryptocurrencies; and 2) Cy-
bercrime influencing the direct structures of cryptocurrencies themselves. Despite existing
for less than a decade, cryptocurrencies have experienced a broad variety of both types of
cybercriminality which merit significant regulatory attention, which perhaps influence the
presence of market mis-pricing and to which we briefly discuss.
The largest example of cybercriminality sourced from the use of cryptocurrency was
that of Silk Road, which was an online black market used to sell drugs on the dark web11.
The website was launched in February 2011, where sellers had to purchase an account in
an auction, but this was later changed to a fixed fee. In October 2013, the FBI shut down
the website and arrested Ross Ulbricht. On 6 November 2013, Silk Road version 2.0 (v2.0)
went online, however, it was also shut down. On news of the closure of Silk Road, Bitcoin
fell from approximately $145 to $109. This was because of the cryptocurrencies widespread
use due to the provision of anonymity while completing online drug deals. The FBI had
estimated that Silk Road had accounted for almost 5% of the total Bitcoin economy. Bitcoin
presented evidence of resilience during its survival of the Silk Road closure.
The second form of cybercriminality is denoted as cybercriminality attacking the direct
structures of cryptocurrencies. A December 2017 report released by Ernst & Young12
stated that the total amount of funds raised by ICOs is approaching $4 billion (US) which
is found to be twice the volume of venture capital investments in blockchain projects.
10Double-spending is a potential flaw in a digital cash scheme in which the same single digital token can be
spent more than once. This is possible because a digital token consists of a digital file that can be duplicated
or falsified. As with counterfeit money, such double-spending leads to inflation by creating a new amount
of fraudulent currency that did not previously exist. This devalues the currency relative to other monetary
units, and diminishes user trust as well as the circulation and retention of the currency. Fundamental
cryptographic techniques to prevent double-spending while preserving anonymity in a transaction are blind
signatures and particularly in off-line systems, secret splitting.
11The dark web is the World Wide Web content that exists on darknets, overlay networks that use
the Internet but require specific software, configurations or authorization to access. The darknets which
constitute the dark web include small, friend-to-friend peer-to-peer networks, as well as large, popular
networks like Tor, Freenet, and I2P, operated by public organizations and individuals. Users of the dark
web refer to the regular web as Clearnet due to its unencrypted nature.
12Located at: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-research-initial-coin-offerings-icos/
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Disturbingly, the report estimates that almost 10% of all ICO proceeds are stolen by hackers.
While this is an incredible indictment of the ICO process, it is not the only mechanism
through which cryptocurrency investors have been defrauded. Hacking both exchanges and
cryptocurrency wallets has become more widespread and more severe in the recent past.
The most substantial cases include:
1. The DAO was established as an Ethereum-based venture capital organization that
was governed by all of its participants. It was envisioned to be a robust platform that
enabled the creation and implementation of DApps (Decentralized Applications) on
its platform. The crowdfunding for the DAO raised more than $150 million in Ether
in May 2016. By the following month, hackers exploited a flaw in the DAO and stole
$50 million.
2. Bitfinex is a Hong Kong-based cryptocurrency exchange platform owned by iFinex
Inc. It also provides wallet and trading services for cryptocurrencies. Bitfinex has
suffered a few hacks during its time of operation but the biggest hack was in 2016
when almost 120,000 BTC were stolen from the platform. This amounted to about
$72 million and it is the second largest Bitcoin exchange hack.
3. Established in 2010, Bitfinex quickly grew to the pinnacle of the Bitcoin trading
market. It came crashing down after the biggest cryptocurrency hack occurred on
the platform in 2014. It resulted in the theft of over 700,000 BTC worth about $473
million.
4. In January 2018, hackers broke into a cryptocurrency exchange called Coincheck Inc.
and made off with nearly $500 million in digital tokens. It’s one of the biggest heists
in history, with the exchange losing more than 500 million of NEM coins.
Gandal et al. [2018] presented an overview of the key issues associated with techno-
logical advances, however, cryptocurrencies due to their anonymous characteristics have
been linked with numerous types of crimes including ‘facilitating marketplaces for: assas-
sins; attacks on businesses; child exploitation (including pornography); corporate espionage;
counterfeit currencies; drugs; fake IDs and passports; high yield investment schemes; sex-
ual exploitation; stolen credit cards and credit card numbers; and weapons’. Göbel et al.
[2016] use a simplified Markov model that tracks the contrasting states of belief about the
blockchain of a small pool of dishonest miners and the rest of the community to estab-
lish the use of block-hiding strategies, then using discrete-event simulation to study the
behaviour of the network. Their results indicate that both the honest and dishonest min-
ers were worse off than they would have been if no dishonest mining was present. Glaser
et al. [2014] found strong evidence supporting the view that uninformed users approaching
digital currencies were not primarily interested in an alternative transaction system, but
instead, it’s inherent secondary uses and role as an alternative investment vehicle, while
Vandezande [2017] attempted to investigate the effects of anti-money laundering legislation
on cryptocurrencies in the European Union. Pieters and Vivanco [2017] found evidence
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of regulation failure, cross-exchange price variation and strong differences across markets
that do not require customer identification for establishing an account. The latter result is
found to be related to cross-exchange price variation.
Houy [2014] found that an attacker is equally as likely to be successful when attack-
ing cryptocurrencies who implement a proof-of-stake transaction validation scheme are less
vulnerable to a 51% attack than those cryptocurrencies implementing a proof of work
transaction validation system despite the widely held belief that the former strategy was
risk-mitigating. Pinzón and Rocha [2016] investigated time advantages to attacker agents
in the Bitcoin network to present two different attack models and an algorithmic exper-
imentation comparing the models to present evidence that advantages are non-negligible
for cases when the attacker has enough time to mine fraudulent blocks on the network.
The authors develop methodologies to correctly model and detect double-spending attacks.
Gramoli [2017] discussed the advantage of the blockchain Byzantine consensus definition
over previous definitions in comparison to emerging consistent blockchains to discuss the
dangers of using these blockchains without understanding precisely the guarantees that
their consensus algorithms offer. Zimba et al. [2018] model multi-stage cryptocurrency ran-
somware attacks using WannaCry ransomware13. Wang et al. [2017] conducted a systematic
study on the security threats to blockchain while reviewing potential security enhancement
solutions that could be used in the development of various blockchain solutions. Trautman
[2013] proposed the concept of DV-PoA (designated-verifier proof of assets) for Bitcoin ex-
changes using elliptic curve cryptography which they prove to be secure and efficient. Li
et al. [2017] propose a framework to present greater transparency to the users of cryptocur-
rencies through the reduction of sensitive information such as the amount traded using the
Paillier cryptosystem for encryption and decryption in an attempt to mitigate active and
passive attacks.
3. Cryptocurrency market development
3.1. Diversification benefits
Brière et al. [2015] found using spanning tests that Bitcoin investments offer significant
diversification benefits to show that the inclusion of even a small proportion of Bitcoins may
dramatically improve the risk-return trade-off of well-diversified portfolios. The authors,
however, state that the results should be taken with caution as the data may reflect early
13The WannaCry ransomware attack was a May 2017 worldwide cyberattack by the WannaCry ran-
somware cryptoworm, which targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system by en-
crypting data and demanding ransom payments in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. It propagated through
EternalBlue, an exploit in older Windows systems released by The Shadow Brokers a few months prior
to the attack. While Microsoft had released patches previously to close the exploit, much of WannaCry’s
spread was from organizations that had not applied these, or were using older Windows systems that were
past their end-of-life. WannaCry also took advantage of installing backdoors onto infected systems.
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stage behaviour which may not last in the medium or long-run. Corbet et al. [2018a] analyse
in time and frequency domains, the relationships between the three most popular cryptocur-
rencies and a variety of other financial assets to find evidence of the relative isolations of
these assets from the financial and economic assets. Results show that cryptocurrencies
may offer diversification benefits for investors with short-term investment horizons. Baur
et al. [2017] analysed the statistical properties of Bitcoin to find that it is uncorrelated
with traditional asset classes in periods of financial turmoil. Transaction data of Bitcoin
accounts show that Bitcoins are mainly used as a speculative investment and not as an
alternative currency or medium of exchange. Dyhrberg [2016a] export the financial asset
capabilities of Bitcoin using GARCH methodologies, showing several similarities to gold
and the dollar, indicative of hedging capabilities and advantages as a medium of exchange.
Bitcoin is found to have a place on financial markets and it can be classified as something
in between gold and the US dollar on a scale from pure medium of exchange advantages to
pure store of value advantages. Baur et al. [2017] extended the work of Dyhrberg [2016a]
to replicate the above findings and demonstrates that exact replication is not possible and
that alternative statistical methodologies provide more reliable, however, very different re-
turns. The findings show that Bitcoin exhibits distinctively different return, volatility and
correlation characteristics compared to other assets including gold and the United States
dollar. Dyhrberg [2016b] show that Bitcoin can be used as a hedge against stocks in the
Financial Times Stock Exchange Index and against the US dollar in the short-term. Bitcoin
is thereby found to possess some of the same hedging abilities as gold and can be included
in the variety of tools available to market analysts to hedge market-specific risk. Bouri et al.
[2017] used a dynamic conditional correlation model to examine whether Bitcoin can act as
a hedge and safe have for four major world stock indices, bond, oil, gold, the general com-
modity index and the US dollar index using data between July 2011 and December 2015.
The empirical results indicate that Bitcoin is a poor hedge and is suitable for diversification
purposes only. Bouri et al. [2017] examined whether Bitcoin can hedge global uncertainty
as measured by the first principal component of the VIX and fourteen developed and devel-
oping equity markets to reveal that Bitcoin does act as a hedge against uncertainty. Demir
et al. [2018] analysed the prediction power of the economic policy uncertainty index (EPU)
index on daily Bitcoin returns using Bayesian Graphical Structural Vector Autoregressive
modelling with Ordinary Least Squares and Quantile-on-Quantile Regression estimations.
Results find that the EPU has predictive power on Bitcoin returns with a primarily negative
association, with Bitcoin serving as a purposeful hedging tool against uncertainty.
Ciaian et al. [2018] used an ADRL methodology to examine the interdependencies be-
tween Bitcoin and Atlcoin markets in the short and long-run for the period between 2013
and 2016 to find that both markets are interdependent. The relationship is found to be
significantly stronger in the short-run than in the long-run, where macro-financial indica-
tors determine the Altcoin price formation to a slightly greater degree than Bitcoin does.
Selgin [2015] discuss diversification benefits of the use of cryptocurrencies through the role
of ‘synthetic commodity money’ which is best described as a product that shares features
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of ‘commodity’ and ‘fiat’ base money, resembling fiat money which has no non-monetary
value and commodity money in that it is absolutely scarce. The authors argue that these
special characteristics of synthetic commodity money might allow for the supply of foun-
dations for a monetary regime that does not require oversight by any monetary authority
but might be able to provide for a high degree of macroeconomic stability. Turk and Klinc
[2017] investigated the diversification benefits of blockchain by focusing on its potential use
in the construction industry. The authors concluded that while blockchain appears to pro-
vide solutions to some industry problems, it is more likely that it will be built into generic
IT infrastructure on top of which construction applications are built, potentially making
the construction process less centralised. Recently, Urquhart and Zhang [2018] assess the
relationship between Bitcoin and currencies at the hourly frequency find that Bitcoin can
be an intraday hedge for the CHF, EUR and GBP, but acts as a diversifier for the AUD,
CAD and JPY. They also find that Bitcoin is a safe haven during periods of extreme mar-
ket turmoil for the CAD, CHF and GBP. Recently, Platanakis and Urquhart [2018] have
examined the diversification benefits of adding Bitcoin to a stock-bond portfolio and find
that the out-of-sample benefits are quite considerable with substantially higher Sharpe,
Sortino and Omega ratios, which hold across all different asset allocation strategies and
risk aversions. Further, Platanakis et al. [2018] examine the performance of naïve (1/N)
and optimal (Markowitz) diversification in a portfolio of four popular cryptocurrencies and
show there is very little to select between naïve diversification and optimal diversification.
Brauneis and Mestel [2018a] assessed the effects of diversified cryptocurrency invest-
ments in a traditional Markowitz mean-variance framework using a broad sample of the
500 most capitalized cryptocurrencies as of December 2017 employing daily data from Jan-
uary 1, 2015 to 31 December, 2017. Paper identifies that naively diversified portfolios
outperform the mean-variance optimized portfolios. Similar results reported by Liu [2018]
who analysed the diversification benefits of cryptocurrency markets. Findings show that
naïve 1/N portfolio of cryptocurrencies consistently demonstrate better performance than
other asset allocation models. Guesmi et al. [2018] analyses the conditional cross effects
and volatility spillover between Bitcoin and other financial assets providing evidence that
Bitcoin can offer diversification benefits and hedging opportunities for investors. Particu-
larly, the results shows that hedging strategies involving gold, oil, emerging stock markets
and Bitcoin reduce considerably a portfolio’s variance in comparison to the variance of a
portfolio composed of gold, oil and stocks from emerging stock only.
Giudici and Abu-Hashish [2018] Guidici and Abu-Hashish (2018) developed an extended
Vector Autoregressive model based on network models that introduce a contemporaneous
contagion component that describes contagion effects between assets prices. The model
employed to Bitcoin prices from various exchanges and also other assets prices such as gold,
oil, SP500, and USD-Yuan and USD-Euro exchange rates. The results show that bitcoin
prices from different exchanges are highly interrelated, while bitcoin prices are unrelated
with prices of other assets. The relationships between Bitcoin and other assets have been
also analysed by Ji et al. [2018] who employed a data-driven methodology, so-called the
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direct acyclic graph, to daily index values for Bitcoin, stock, bonds, commodities and cur-
rencies for the period from 19 July 2010 to 31 January 2017. Authors found that Bitcoin
is isolated from other assets, and none of the selected assets can significantly influence
the Bitcoin market. However, the paper reports the existence of lagged relationships be-
tween Bitcoin and other assets during the beer market. This can be explained by the fact
that herding behaviour in cryptocurrencies tends to occur as uncertainty increases (Bouri
et al. [2018]). Time-varying herding behaviour limits portfolio diversification benefits has
implications to market efficiency and justifies the importance of regulation.
3.2. Market efficiency
Market efficiency can be determined by a number of specific factors, however, cryptocur-
rencies market efficiency can be measured through a host of progressive factors including
the existence of a new futures exchange, liquid cross-currency indices and the relative re-
duction of intra-day volatility, although daily volatility remains high. In this section, we
separate market inefficiency into product efficient, as well as price efficiency.
3.2.1. Product efficiency
Bouoiyour and Selmi [2015] use ARDL bounds testing to reveal extremely speculative
behaviour of Bitcoin, its partial usefulness in trade transactions without overlooking its de-
pendence to the Shanghai Stock Market and the hash-rate14. The authors find no evidence
of Bitcoin providing a safe haven while Roth [2015] investigated the architectural struc-
ture of Bitcoin using a functional analysis by employing the Systems Modelling Language
(SysML). Luther [2016] stated that blockchain technology may be adopted if it significantly
reduces the costs of processing transactions. However, Bitcoins and Altcoins are unlikely
to function as more than a niche money except in the unlikely event of hyperinflation, gov-
ernment support or both. Harvey [2014] further support the continued growth of Bitcoin
should a range of price volatility and regulatory problems be overcome. Demir et al. [2018]
show that any situation with a fixed fee is equivalent to another situation with a limited
block size. By making the block size a non-binding constraint and at the same time letting
the fee be fixed as the outcome of a decentralised competitive market cannot guarantee the
existence of Bitcoin in the long-run. Prybila et al. [2017] investigate runtime verification
for a business process using the Bitcoin blockchain which is realised using a fully func-
tional software prototype. The authors show that their blockchain-based approach enables
a seamless execution monitoring and verification of choreographies while simultaneously
preserving anonymity and independence of the process participants. Huang et al. [2018]
investigate fog computing which can be viewed as an extension of cloud computing that
enables transactions and resources at the edge of the network. The authors propose a fair
14A hash is the output of a hash function and, as it relates to Bitcoin, the hash-rate is the speed at which
a compute is completing an operation in the Bitcoin code. A higher hash rate is better when mining as it
increases your opportunity of finding the next block and receiving the reward.
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payment scheme for outsourcing computations based on Bitcoin. Due to the advantages
of Bitcoin syntax, the users can transact directly without needing a bank. The author’s
proposed construction can guarantee that no matter how a malicious outsourcer behaves,
the honest workers will be paid if he/she completed the computing tasks. Delgado-Segura
et al. [2017] present a fair protocol for data trading where the commercial deal, in terms of
delivering the data and performing the payment is atomic since the seller cannot redeem the
payment unless the buyer obtains the data and the buyer cannot obtain the data without
performing the payment. Maesa et al. [2017] investigate the behaviour of blockchain users
through an analysis of the topological properties showing that the structural properties of
the network are due to peculiar unusual patterns in the network graph which are found to be
due to artificial users’ behaviours and not strictly related to normal economic interactions.
Lahmiri and Bekiros [2018] investigate, assess and detect chaos, randomness, and multi-
scale temporal correlation structure in prices and returns of this specific virtual and specu-
lative market throughout two distinct time periods; namely under a low-level regime period
during which prices slowly increased, and during a high and turbulent regime time period
whereby they exponentially increased. The authors found evidence that the level of uncer-
tainty in returns has significantly increased during the high-price time period compared to
the low-price period. Both prices and returns exhibit long-range correlations and multi-
fractality. The fat-tailed probability distributions are the main source of multi-fractality in
the time series of prices and returns. Furthermore, short (long) fluctuations in returns are
dominant during low (high) price-regime time period, respectively.
The existence of structural breaks in Bitcoin volatilities has been also reported by Ardia
et al. [2018]. Authors found that a two-regime MSGARCH model demonstrated the best in-
sample forecasting performance with an inverted leverage effect in low- and high- volatility
regimes, while for one-day ahead forecast Ardia et al. [2018] report that Value-at-Risk
Markov-switching specifications out-perform standard single-regime GARCH models. The
impact of structural breaks (SB) on the dual long memory levels of Bitcoin and Ethereum
price returns analysed by Mensi et al. [2018]. Results show the dual long memory property
of Bitcoin and Ethereum which contradict the efficient market hypothesis. Mensi et al.
[2018] also found that after accounting for structural breaks the long memory in the mean
and variance significantly decreases. Finally, a study by Thies and Molnar [2018] also
indicate the existence of frequent structural breaks in Bitcoin returns providing evidence
from Bayesian change point model.
3.2.2. Price efficiency
Price efficient refers to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which has been examined ex-
tensively in the literature. Urquhart [2016] was the first to examine the market efficiency
of Bitcoin and found through a battery of tests that Bitcoin was inefficient, although it
was becoming less inefficient over time. The result of the inefficiency of Bitcoin has been
supported in follow-up studies that have used a range of different testing procedures and
different data sets, where examples are Bariviera et al. [2017], Jiang et al. [2017], Nadarajah
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and Chu [2017], Alvarez-Ramirez et al. [2018], Brauneis and Mestel [2018b], Caporale et al.
[2018], Cheah et al. [2018], Khuntia and Pattanayak [2018], Lahmiri and Bekiros [2018],
Sensoy [2018], Tiwari et al. [2018] and Vidal-Tomás and Ibañez [2018].
For example, Charfeddine and Maouchi [2018] found that the long-range dependence
behaviour has been exhibited by the returns and volatilities of Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Ripple,
while for Ethereum the long-range behaviour has been observed only in volatility series. The
findings support the position of Urquhart [2016] on the relative inefficiency of cryptocur-
rency markets, which again can be explained by their immaturity. For Bitcoin, Takaishi
and Adachi [2018] provided evidence of the Taylor effect which indicates that the real return
time series is expected to have a richer time structure in time series than the random walk
process, supporting the inefficiency of Bitcoin.
Therefore the literature suggests that Bitcoin returns do not conform to the Efficient
Market Hypothesis and that Bitcoin returns are not independent but predictable. This is
further documented by Urquhart [2017] who found significant evidence of clustering at round
numbers, with over 10% of prices ending with 00 decimals compared to other variations but
there is no significant pattern of returns after the round number, while further supporting
the hypothesis of Harris (1991) by showing that price and volume have a significant positive
relationship with price clustering at whole numbers.
4. Unique issues in cryptocurrency markets
As cryptocurrencies continue to develop they have merited the attention of policy-
makers and regulators for a host of differing reasons. However, there have been three
specific situations that have been quite unique to cryptocurrency markets. The first is based
on product sustainability which is being undermined as cryptocurrencies continue to grow
due to the enormous electricity output that must be outlayed during the mining process.
The second unique issue that we investigate is that of market correlations, which develops
on earlier coverage of the diversification benefits of broad cryptocurrencies. The final issue
investigated is the separation of commercial cryptocurrency usage to decipher as to whether
there is a fundamental need for the use of cryptocurrencies or has the company attempted
to take advantage of the hysteria around the new financial product for commercial gain.
We examine this issue through the recent decision by Kodak to announce the Kodakcoin
ICO.
4.1. Sustainability
The rapid growth of Bitcoin prices has attracted many investors from around the globe,
generating not only an increase in mining difficulty but also pushing Bitcoin energy con-
sumption to an enormous level. It is now becoming more difficult to find a new block and,
consequentially, each transaction consumes more electricity now than it used to be in past.
According to Bitcoin Sustainability Report in January 2018 Bitcoin energy consumption
per one transaction increased on 53% and equal to 397 KWh, which is enough to power
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1 U.S. household for more than 13 days15. In February 2018 Bitcoin electricity consump-
tion increased to 764 KWh per unique transaction. The annual electricity consumption of
Bitcoin increased from 9.5 TWh till 50.8 TWh in last 12 months, and In February 2018
Bitcoin consumes as much energy as Uzbekistan, representing 0.23 % the world’s electricity
consumption. Similarly, the increase was evident for Ethereum from 2,3 TWh to 14.5 TWh
per year16. While the issue of environmental sustainability of cryptocurrencies is under
debate in the media (The Guardian, November 2017), academia has been relatively slow to
address this urgent issue. Only a couple of papers discussed the impact of the growth of
these digital asset classes on the environment. Sustainability in the context of environmen-
tal and economic aspects have been analysed by Vranken (2017), and the results provide
an opposite conclusion to the popular belief. The paper claims that the energy consump-
tion of mining Bitcoin is not excessive. One of the approaches used is a comparison of
daily mining revenue and daily mining energy costs. When the mining revenue drop below
mining cost miners has to switch to more efficient hardware, which encouraging continuous
technological development.
4.2. Market correlations
While we have identified the key areas of research related to the role of cryptocurrencies
as an alternative investment and source of diversification, there have been specific exam-
ples of dynamic correlations that merit special attention and further research. In early 2018
during the sharp collapse of Bitcoin as presented in Figure 3 there were three specific corre-
lation events that merited attention: 1) market volatility was found to have transferred from
stocks to broad cryptocurrencies; 2) a strong inverse correlation between cryptocurrencies
and gold coin sales; and 3) correlations between cryptocurrencies depending on their flavour.
Each of these individual cases merits the attention of regulators and policy-makers alike
due to the potential contagion effects that could occur should cryptocurrencies continue to
increase in price, or indeed collapse.
Intra-cryptocurrency volatility transfer and correlation effects were witnessed in January
2018. While the price of Bitcoin collapsed by approximately $10,000 each, the correlations of
different cryptocurrencies began to shift, presenting evidence that traders were beginning to
make informed investment decisions based on the flavour of the cryptocurrency. As Bitcoin
prices collapsed, short-term correlations with three specific altcoins began to change, namely
IOTA, Litecoin and Bitcoin Cash. Both Litecoin and Bitcoin Cash are forks of Bitcoin
designed to reduce friction to enable smaller everyday transactions which are susceptible to
long processing times and high processing fees. IOTA, however, is designed for machine-
to-machine payments. The contrasting correlations of major cryptocurrencies and these
three altcoins present evidence that cryptocurrency traders are making somewhat informed
15https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-sustainability-report-01-2018
16https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption
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decisions. However, the correlations of broad cryptocurrencies are also somewhat damning
as evident across a host of major international bubbles, including that of ‘Tulipmania17’.
The year 2017 was found to be the least volatile year since 1964 with just 6.8% realised
volatility for the S&P 500 Index. Transfer of market volatility. Bitcoin, however, was over
twelve times more volatile during the same time period. While many forces drive daily fluc-
tuations in equities. There was a stability in stocks that stemmed from an especially strong
consensus in late 2016 about the year ahead, which is further reflected in the relatively low
levels of the Cboe Volatility Index (VIX) which is presented in Figure 5. It is such changes
in the expectations of corporate earnings that have the most impact. For Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies, this is not the case. For cryptocurrencies, there are no earnings and no
consensus valuation frameworks, except for that which investor’s place on the product.
The rush to buy cryptocurrencies pushes prices higher, leading to a spiral of price volatility
that is generated from the frenetic self-reinforcing momentum and speculative behaviour of
cryptocurrency investors observed between 2014 and late-2017.
Dyhrberg et al. [2018] analyses Bitcoin market microstructure on three US cryptocur-
rency exchanges. Paper employs a high-frequency data intraday data of individual traders
and quotes and suggest that most trades are non-algorithmic and executed by retail in-
vestors. The results also suggest that the volume of trading is positively correlated with
volatility and negatively correlated with spreads. Using a number of Bitcoin transactions
Koutmos [2018] found that a one standard deviation shock to transaction activity leads
to just over a 0.30% gain in returns on the third day following the shock. However, the
results report the reversal pattern by the sixth day after shock. The assessment of bidirec-
tional linkages between Bitcoin returns and transaction activity show that the magnitude
of spillovers from a return to transaction activity is larger than vice versa.
Hu et al. [2018] analysed intraday price behaviour of Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Ripple
by examining the price clustering of non-fiat cryptocurrency exchange rate pairs. The
findings report a significant price clustering at round numbers 00, 000, and 0000 providing
support for negotiation hypothesis that predicts higher clustering for higher prices and price
volatility. Hu et al. [2018] also found evidence of strategic trading in cryptocurrencies.
Furthermore, Bouri et al. [2018] suggest the possibility to predict Bitcoin price movements
17Tulipmania was a period during which contract prices for some bulbs of the recently introduced and
fashionable tulip reached extraordinarily high levels and then dramatically collapsed in February 1637. It
is generally considered the first recorded speculative bubble. The theoretical development supporting the
growth and development of bubbles has been covered in detail Blanchard [1979], Blanchard and Watson
[1982], Evans [1991] and Bhattacharya and Yu [2008] among others. Bubbles are denoted as It is created
by a surge in asset prices unwarranted by the fundamentals of the asset and driven by exuberant market
behaviour. When investors are no longer willing to buy at the elevated price, a significant sell-off occurs,
causing the bubble to blow up. This can sometimes be identified by stress metrics and indices. To date,
the authors have not identified any research that traces the contagion of indexed cryptocurrency stress
in a manner similar to Corbet and Twomey [2014] or Corbet [2014]. This would be considered to be an
interesting avenue for future research.
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based on price information from the aggregate commodity index and gold prices, however
authors suggest to use non-standard cointegration methods to analyse the relations between
Bitcoin and other asset classes due to reported the asymmetry, non-linearity quantiles-
dependency of these relations. Finally, the analysis of 456 cryptocurrencies performed by
Wei [2018] shows that return predictability diminishes in cryptocurrencies with high market
liquidity, contributing to cryptocurrency efficiency and liquidity debates.
Insert Figure 5 about here
During the January 2018 Bitcoin price collapse, sales of gold coins spiked, indicating
continued areas of inverse correlations. CoinInvest, an online gold dealer, claimed to have
sold about 30kg of gold coins worth over $1 million on just the 16 of January as Bitcoin
crashed by approximately 40%. This reported level of trade was five times that of normal
levels and was reported across a broad variety of online gold coin dealerships. This inverse
correlation is reported to have been generated through an ability for cryptocurrency traders
to cash out and buy physical gold. This inverse dynamic serves as another proof of a
potential negative correlation between investors’ interest towards gold and cryptocurrencies.
Klein et al. [2018] compared Bitcoin to Gold and claim that Bitcoin acts in exact opposite
manner in times of market distress. While gold can be effective hedge from a financial
crisis due to the "flight-to-quality" behaviour of investors, Bitcoin is highly correlated with
downwards markets. Therefore according to the results of Klein et al. [2018] Bitcoin is no
hedge against equity investments. Selmi et al. [2018] compared the hedging properties of
Bitcoin with Gold. The results are opposite to Klein et al. [2018] and suggest that both
Gold and Bitcoin can be effective diversifier for investors during time of the economic and
political turmoil. Furthermore, similarly to Gold Bitcoin can acts as a diversifier for oil
price movements. According to Corbet et al. [2018] the introduction of Bitcoin futures and
the ability to trade these would have resulted in a reduction in the variance of Bitcoin
prices, or facilitated hedging strategies that could have mitigated pricing risk in the spot
market, it is possible that the Bitcoin could have acted as a unit of account, moving it
closer to being a currency.
4.3. The curious Kodak case
On the 9 of January 2018, camera manufacturer Kodak announced that it was entering
the cryptocurrency market through the creation of KODAKOne, described as a revolution-
ary new image rights management and protection platform secured in the blockchain. Ko-
dak announced that its development seamlessly registers, manages and monetizes creative
assets for the photographic community (Corbet et al. [2018]). It would be used to underpin
the assured buying and selling of rights-cleared and protected digital assets while ensuring
transparency. Figure 6 presents the price, daily percentage volatility and a measure of news
sentiment for Kodak (as measured by Google Trends data). It is immediately evident that
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the announcement had a significant sharp impact on volatility (which peaked at over 60%
per day) with shares increasing from over $3 per share to over $12 in less than one week.
This was associated with an increase in market sentiment and research using terms such as
‘Kodak’ and ‘KODAKCoin’. Kodak CEO Jeff Clarke said in a press statement, ‘For many
in the technology industry, ‘blockchain’ and ‘cryptocurrency’ are hot buzzwords, but for
photographers who’ve long struggled to assert control over their work and how it’s used,
these buzzwords are the keys to solving what felt like an unsolvable problem.’ In theory,
photographers will be able to upload their images to a platform called KodakOne, create a
blockchain-based license for each image, and use web-crawling software to scour the internet
looking for copyright violations. Instead of using dollars, photographers can have clients
pay them in KODAKCoins. However, there are many analysts and market-commentators
alike that continue to identify Kodak’s strategy as a technique to capitalise on the current
cryptocurrency frenzy or is it indeed a valid evolutionary characteristic of blockchain18.
Insert Figure 6 about here
These ‘sudden’ announcements have also attracted the attention of regulators. Jay
Clayton, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), said that the
agency was ‘looking closely at the disclosures of public companies that shift their business
models to capitalize on the perceived promise of distributed ledger technology.’ However,
Kodak then decided to delay the ICO of KODAKCoin in an attempt to verify accredited
status of approximately 40,000 potential investors. The SEC requires that an individual
accredited investor has a net worth that exceeds $1 million, or an annual income of at
least $200,000, along with other conditions. The company claims it needs ‘several weeks’ to
verify the ‘accredited investors’ status of those who applied to invest in the ICO. Potential
investors from outside the US would then be considered in accordance with their local
jurisdictions. But one key point that can be taken from the case of Kodak is that it’s
price, two months later, remained elevated by almost 100% of that from early January
2018. Even without the implementation of an ICO, the announcement of a cryptocurrency
related plan has potentially incorporated any cryptocurrency speculation into the share
price of a publicly traded company. This is a point of concern for regulators and policy-
makers alike.
18In August 2018, The Kodak-branded ‘Kashminer’ Bitcoin mining scheme collapsed, with Eastman
Kodak distancing itself from the company behind it. This has led to some complications with the release
of Kodakcoin, however, the company behind the Kashminer says that the US Securities and Exchanges
Commission (SEC) had prevented the scheme from going ahead and is now hoping to establish a Bitcoin
mining system in Iceland.
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5. Concluding comments
In this paper, we conduct a systematic analysis based on the growing breadth and
depth of cryptocurrency research that has been published since 2009 up to August 2018.
We acknowledge that this research field is immature, and new empirical and theoretical
evidence continues to emerge on a monthly basis. Nevertheless, we document what is
currently known about cryptocurrencies in the finance literature, whilst also providing
real-life examples of ICOs and regulatory issues. We also explain the main limitations, as
well as the concerns, with cryptocurrencies, as well as explain the regulatory issues that face
governments and central banks alike. A limitation to our systematic analysis is the potential
exclusion of some relevant studies that will become available during the publication process.
However, we are quite confident that we have included the vast majority of the relevant,
peer-reviewed studies, and we have updated this review during the revision process.
Our main findings demonstrate that there are numerous gaps in the cryptocurrency
related literature. Although there are many potential areas of interest regarding cryptocur-
rencies, we identify ten important gaps in the literature in Table 5 which hopefully other
researchers can use to further the knowledge in this area. While cryptocurrencies continue
to develop both as a product and a traded-market, it is important that we moderate our
expectations of their potential value and benefits to society while being cautious and con-
sidering towards the inherent dangers that they could generate within our society. Isolating
lessons from our past, such as those found within ‘Tulipmania’ and the ‘Dot-com’ collapses
contribute to the broad accusations of wider bubble-behaviour. But such accusations are
directed in the knowledge that the future of finance and broad technology may lie in the
underlying blockchain on which cryptocurrencies are based.
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Figure 1: Duration of data coverage for incorporated quantitative cryptocurrency based literature
Note: The above figure presents a visual representation of the data that has been included in the incorporated
cryptocurrency research. Where multiple samples are included in the research, the presented data coverage is that
based on the key results of the included research.
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Figure 2: Frequency of cryptocurrency selection as central topic of investigation
Note: The above figure presents the frequency of selection (measured as a percentage) of cryptocurrencies as a central topic of investigation within
the research that has been selected for use in our systematic analysis.
35
Figure 3: Bitcoin price level and daily price volatility (2010-2018)
Note: The above panel represents the price of Bitcoin in US$. The bottom panel represents represents the daily
percentage volatility of Bitcoin returns.
36
Figure 4: The Cryptocurrency Trilemma
Note: This trilemma develops on the three key interrelated issues that cryptocurrencies must be overcome and are
each considered in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. While there have been significant declines in the price of Bitcoin
associated with rumours of regulatory imposition, even the widespread banning of cryptocurrencies in some
jurisdictions, the easing of such regulatory pressures should theoretically generate substantial price appreciation.
Further, the growth of significant episodes of cybercrime continues to undermine confidence and stability in the
cryptocurrency market with significant consequences. However, the presence of inherent pricing bubbles generate
substantial rewards for those who wish to profit from such illicit tactics as cryptocurrency market hacking a theft.
Growth in cybercrime also generates an immediate need for improved international regulatory alignment, but is
also associated with the widespread banning of such financial instruments in some jurisdictions, therefore further
misalignment of the international regulatory approach.
37
Figure 5: Daily price level of the Cboe Volatility Index (VIX)
Note: The CBOE Volatility Index, known by its ticker symbol VIX, is a popular measure of the stock market’s
expectation of volatility implied by S&P 500 index options, calculated and published by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE). It is colloquially referred to as the fear index or the fear gauge.
38
Figure 6: Share price, price volatility and news dissemination for Kodak between November 2017 and
February 2018
Note: The top panel represents the share price of Kodak shares in US$. The middle panel represents the daily price
volatility of Kodak, measured as daily percentage change. The lower panel represents the indexed level of
investigation of the term ‘Kodak’ as presented with data from Google Trends as investigated in Corbet et al. [2018].
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Table 1: Key characteristics of included non-quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Journal Broad Coverage Central Topic of
Literature
Bubble Dynamics
1 Sustainability of bitcoin and
blockchains
Vranken 2017 Current Opinion in En-
vironmental Sustainabil-
ity
Literature and Ex-
planation
Cryptocurrency
Structure
Regulation
2 Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative
Digital Currency
Grinberg 2011 Working Paper Literature Review Bitcoin Status
3 The legal status of online currencies:
Are Bitcoins the future?
Bollen 2013 Working Paper Literature Overview of Legal
Structure
4 It will cost you nothing to kill a Proof
of Stake cryptocurrency
Houy 2014 Working Paper Theoretical Struc-
ture
theoretical
5 Bitcoin financial regulation: Securities,
derivatives, prediction markets and
gambling
Brito et al. 2014 Columbia Science and
Technology Law Review
Literature Review How to regulate
6 Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and
Governance
Bohme et al. 2015 Journal of Economic
Perspectives
Literature Regulation
7 Blockchain Technology and Decentral-
ized Governance: Is the State Still Nec-
essary?
Atzori 2015 Working Paper None Regulation
8 The role of secondary sources on the
taxation of digital currency (Bitcoin)
before IRS guidance was issued
Andrew Gross
et al.
2017 Journal of Accounting
Education
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Bitcoin taxation
9 Are Cryptocurrencies super tax
havens?
Marian 2017 Working Paper Theoretical Struc-
ture
Tax Status
10 Banning Bitcoin Hendrickson
and Luther
2017 Journal of Economic Be-
havior & Organization
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Regulation
11 Copyright in the blockchain era:
Promises and challenges
Savelyev 2017 Computer Law and Se-
curity Review
Literature Review Legal reform for
copyright
12 Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial
Coin Offerings, and the Democratiza-
tion of Public Capital Markets
Rohr and
Wright
2017 Working Paper None Regulation
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Table 1: Key characteristics of included non-quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Journal Broad Coverage Central Topic of
Literature
Cybercriminality
13 Virtual currencies: Bitcoin and what
now after Liberty Reserve, Silk Road
and Mt.Gox?
Trautman 2014 Working Paper Literature Overview of
Criminality
14 Bitcoin blockchain dynamics: The
selfish-mine strategy
Gobel et al. 2016 Performance Evaluation Theoretical Struc-
ture
Transaction
integrity
15 Double-spend Attack Models with
Time Advantange for Bitcoin
Pinzon and
Rocha
2016 Electronic Notes in The-
oretical Computer Sci-
ence
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cybercrime
16 A survey on the security of blockchain
systems
Li et al. 2017 Future Generation Com-
puter Systems
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cryptocurrency
Structure
17 Preserving transaction privacy in Bit-
coin
Wanga et al. 2017 Future Generation Com-
puter Systems
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cryptocurrency
Structure
18 Multi-stage crypto ransomware at-
tacks: A new emerging cyber threat
to critical infrastructure and industrial
control systems
Zimba et al. 2017 Korean Institute of Com-
munication and Informa-
tion Sciences
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cybercrime
19 From blockchain consensus back to
Byzantine consensus
Gramoli 2017 Future Generation Com-
puter Systems
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cybercrime
20 Virtual currencies under EU anti-
money laundering law
Vandezande 2017 Computer Law and Se-
curity Review
Literature Review Cybercrime
Diversification
21 Synthetic commodity money Selgin 2015 Journal of Financial
Stab.
Literature Review Role of Bitcoin
22 Potentials of Blockchain Technology for
Construction Management
Turka and
Klincb
2017 Procedia Engineering Literature Review Potential
other uses for
blockchain
23 Designated-verifier proof of assets for
Bitcoin exchange using elliptic curve
cryptography
Wanga et al. 2018 Future Generation Com-
puter Systems
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cryptocurrency
Structure
(continued on next page)
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Table 1: Key characteristics of included non-quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Journal Broad Coverage Central Topic of
Literature
Efficiency
24 The economics of Bitcoin transaction
fees
Houy 2014 Working Paper Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cost of Bitcoin
25 Analyzing the deployment of Bitcoin’s
P2P network under an AS-level per-
spective
Feld et al. 2014 Procedia Computer Sci-
ence
P2P Routes Market Distribu-
tion
26 Bitcoin Myths and Facts Harvey 2014 Working Paper Literature Review Fact and Fiction
of Bitcoin
27 An Architectural Assessment of Bitcoin Roth 2015 Procedia Computer Sci-
ence
None theoretical
28 Bitcoin and the Future of Digital Pay-
ments
Luther 2016 The Independent Review Literature Review Future of Digital
Payments
29 A fair protocol for data trading based
on Bitcoin transactions
Delgado et al. 2017 Future Generation Com-
puter Systems
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cryptocurrency
Structure
30 Detecting artificial behaviours in the
Bitcoin users graph
Di Francesco
Maesa et al.
2017 Online Social Networks
and Media
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cryptocurrency
Structure
31 Runtime verification for business pro-
cesses utilizing the Bitcoin blockchain
Prybila et al. 2018 Future Generation Com-
puter Systems
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cryptocurrency
Structure
32 Bitcoin-based fair payments for out-
sourcing computations of fog devices
Huanga et al. 2018 Future Generation Com-
puter Systems
Theoretical Struc-
ture
Cryptocurrency
Structure
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Table 2: Key characteristics of included quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Dep.
Var
Reason Selected
Methodology
Frequency Data Source Selected
Controls
N
Bubble Dynamics
33 Crypto-currency bubbles: an
application of the Phillips-
Shi-Yu (2013) methodology
on Mt. Gox bitcoin prices
Cheung et
al.
2015 Price Bubble
testing
Augmented
Dickey-Fuller
Daily bitcoincharts.comNone 1,307
34 Bitcoins as an investment or
speculative vehicle? A first
look
Baek and
Elbeck
2015 Price Price Vol Regression
Model
Daily bitcoincharts.comEquity In-
dices
>1,000
35 Speculative bubbles in Bit-
coin markets? An empirical
investigation into the funda-
mental value of Bitcoin
Cheah and
Fry
2015 Price Pricing
Bubble
Bubble identifi-
cation method-
ology
Daily coindesk.com None >1,000
36 Price Fluctuations and the
Use of Bitcoin: An Empiri-
cal Inquiry
Polasik et
al.
2016 Price Price dy-
namics
Regression
Model
Daily coindesk.com Economic
Variables
>700
37 Negative bubbles and shocks
in cryptocurrency markets
Fry and
Cheah
2016 Price Price dy-
namics
Multivariate
Methodology
Daily coinmarketcap.comNone >1,000
38 From Bitcoin to Big Coin:
The Impact of Social Media
on Bitcoin Performance
Mai et al. 2016 Media
Posts
Product
Attention
VECM Daily bitcoincharts.comSocial Me-
dia
343,769
39 Price dynamics and specula-
tive trading in bitcoin
Blau 2017 Price Price dy-
namics
GARCH Daily bitcoincharts.comBroad cur-
rencies
>1,000
40 An Empirical Study on
Modeling and Prediction of
Bitcoin Prices with Bayesian
Neural Networks Based on
Blockchain Information
Jang and
Lee
2017 Price Price Dis-
covery
Bayesian Neu-
ral Networks
Daily blockchain.info Bitcoin
funda-
mentals
>1,500
41 Can volume predict Bitcoin
returns and volatility? A
quantiles-based approach
Balcilara
et al.
2017 Price Price Dis-
covery
Non-
parametric
causality
Daily bitcoincharts.comVolume 1,587
42 What Causes the Attention
of Bitcoin?
Urquhart 2018 Google
search
Product
Attention
VAR, IRF
and Granger
Causality
Daily bitcoincharts.comVolume >1,200
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Table 2: Key characteristics of included quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Dep.
Var
Reason Selected
Methodology
Frequency Data Source Selected
Controls
N
43 A new look at Cryptocur-
rencies
Phillip et
al.
2018 Price Market
Vol
Stochastic Vol
Model
Cross-
section
Brave New
Coin
None 1,225
44 An application of extreme
value theory to cryptocur-
rencies
Gkillas
and Katsi-
ampa
2018 Price Market
Risk
VaR, Expected
Shortfall
Daily coindesk.com Other
cryptocur-
rencies
2,655
45 Datestamping the Bitcoin
and Ethereum bubbles
Corbet et
al.
2018 Price Price dy-
namics
Regression
Model
Daily coindesk.com None 3,227
46 The best of two worlds:
Forecasting high frequency
volatility for cryptocurren-
cies and traditional curren-
cies with Support Vector Re-
gression
Peng et al. 2018 Price Price
Volatility
GARCH Daily Altcoin
Charts
Currency
(Euro,
Yen,
Pound)
>400
Regulation
47 The economics of Bitcoin
and similar private digital
currencies
Dwyer 2015 Price Price dy-
namics
Literature Re-
view
Daily None None >700
48 The Evolution of the Bit-
coin Economy: Extracting
and Analyzing the Network
of Payment Relationships
Tasca et
al.
2016 Block
height
Use of
Bitcoin
Network Anal-
ysis
Tick/HF Bitcoin Core None 355,551
49 Does Governance Have a
Role in Pricing? Cross-
Country Evidence From
Bitcoin Markets
Viglione 2017 Price Price dy-
namics
Regression
Model
Daily quandl.com Equity In-
dices
342
50 Bitcoin and the bailout Luther
and Salter
2017 App
Down-
loads
Transferring
deposits
(bank
run)
Pareto Ranking Daily Apple App
Store
None 728
(continued on next page)
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Table 2: Key characteristics of included quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Dep.
Var
Reason Selected
Methodology
Frequency Data Source Selected
Controls
N
51 Price manipulation in the
Bitcoin ecosystem
Gandal et
al.
2018 Price Price
Manipu-
lation
Regression
Model
Daily coinmarketcap Other
cryptocur-
rencies
>300
Cybercriminality
52 Financial regulations and
price inconsistencies across
Bitcoin markets
Pieters
and Vi-
vanco
2017 Price Cybercrime Cointegration
Testing
Daily bitcoincharts Bitcoin
funda-
mentals
426
53 Bitcoin - asset or currency?
Revealing users’ hidden in-
tentions
Glaser et
al.
2017 Alt.
Invest-
ment
Alternative
Invest.
ARCH Daily blockchain.info Volume 1,004
Diversification
54 Virtual Currency, Tangible
Return: Portfolio Diversifi-
cation with Bitcoin
Briere et
al.
2015 Price Portfolio
Diversifi-
cation
OLS with
Spanning Tests
Weekly Datastream Broad
currencies
and Com-
modities
179
55 On the hedge and safe haven
properties of Bitcoin: Is it
really more than a diversi-
fier?
Bouri et
al.
2017 Price Divers.
Benefits
DCC GARCH
methodology
Daily Datastream Broad
currencies
and Com-
modities
1,133
56 Does Bitcoin hedge global
uncertainty? Evidence from
wavelet-based quantile-in-
quantile regressions
Bouri et
al.
2017 Price Divers.
Benefits
Quintile Re-
gressions
Daily coindesk.com Equity In-
dices
1,452
57 Bitcoin: Medium of ex-
change or speculative
assets?
Baur et al. 2018 Price Diversification
Benefits
Correlation
Analysis
Daily WinkDex.com Broad
currencies
and Com-
modities
1,334
58 Virtual relationships: Short-
and long-run evidence from
bitcoin and altcoin markets
Ciaian et
al.
2018 Price Price dy-
namics
ARDL method-
ology
Daily bitcoincharts Other
cryptocur-
rencies
1,553
(continued on next page)
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Table 2: Key characteristics of included quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Dep.
Var
Reason Selected
Methodology
Frequency Data Source Selected
Controls
N
59 Hedging capabilities of bit-
coin. Is it the virtual gold?
Dyhrberg
et al.
2016 Price Divers.
Benefits
GARCH Daily coindesk.com Equity In-
dices
1,767
60 Bitcoin, gold and the dollar
- A GARCH volatility anal-
ysis
Dyhrberg
et al.
2016 Price Divers.
Benefits
GARCH Daily coindesk.com Broad
curr and
comm
1,769
61 Bitcoin, gold and the US
dollar - A replication and ex-
tension
Baur et al. 2018 Price Divers.
Benefits
GARCH Daily coindesk.com Currency 1,769
62 Does economic policy uncer-
tainty predict the Bitcoin re-
turns? An empirical investi-
gation
Demira et
al.
2018 Price Divers.
Benefits
Bayesian
Graphical
Structural
VAR
Daily coindesk.com Economic
Policy Un-
certainty
2,678
63 Exploring the dynamic re-
lationships between cryp-
tocurrencies and other fi-
nancial assets
Corbet et
al.
2018 Price Divers.
Benefits
Generalised
variance de-
composition
methodology
Daily cryptocompare Broad
currencies
and Com-
modities
>1,500
64 Is Bitcoin a Hedge or Safe-
Haven for Currencies? An
Intraday Analysis
Urquhart
and Zhang
2018 Price Divers.
Benefits
ADCC and
non-temporal
Hansen
Hourly bitcoincharts Developed
currencies
19,110
Efficiency
65 The Economics of Bitcoins -
Market Characteristics and
Price Jumps
Gronwald 2014 Price Market
Efficiency
GARCH Daily Mt.Gov None >500
66 What Does Bitcoin Look
Like?
Bouoiyour
and Selmi
2015 Price Price Dis-
covery
ARDL Bounds
Testing with
Grander
Causality
Daily blockchain.info Bitcoin
funda-
mentals
>1000
(continued on next page)
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Table 2: Key characteristics of included quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Dep.
Var
Reason Selected
Methodology
Frequency Data Source Selected
Controls
N
67 Price discovery on Bitcoin
exchanges
Brandvold
et al.
2015 Price Price Dis-
covery
Price discovery
model
5-min bitcoincharts None >20,000
68 The inefficiency of Bitcoin Urquhart 2016 Price Market
Efficiency
Hurst Expo-
nents
Daily bitcoinaverage None >1,200
69 The economics of Bitcoin
price formation
Ciaian et
al.
2016 Price Price dy-
namics
Regression
Model
Daily quandl.com Broad
curr and
comm
>500
70 What drives Bitcoin price? Bouoiyour
et al.
2016 Price Price dy-
namics
Empirical
Mode Decom-
position
Daily blockchain None 1,000
71 A first econometric analysis
of the CRIX family
Chen et al. 2016 Price Market
Efficiency
ARIMA Daily hu.berlin/crix 30 other
crypto
>500
72 Cryptocurrency value for-
mation: An empirical study
leading to a cost of produc-
tion model for valuing Bit-
coin
Hayes 2017 Price Production
Cost
Regression
Model
Cross-
section
coinmarketcap Market
Structure
66
73 The technology and eco-
nomic determinants of cryp-
tocurrency exchange rates:
the case of Bitcoin
Li and
Wang
2017 Price Market
Efficiency
VECM Model Daily bitcoincharts Exchange
Rates
1,096
74 Bitcoin Time-of-Day, Day-
of-Week and Month-of-Year
Effects in Returns and Trad-
ing Volume
Baur et al. 2017 Price Market
Efficiency
Means Test Minutely kaggle.com Volume 3,045,857
75 Some stylized facts of the
Bitcoin market
Bariviera
et al.
2017 Price Price dy-
namics
Hurst Expo-
nent
Daily bitcoincharts None 1,404
76 Price clustering in Bitcoin Urquhart 2017 Price Market
Efficiency
Regression
Model
Daily bitcoincharts None >1,500
77 On the inefficiency of Bit-
coin
Nadarajah
and Chu
2017 Price Market
Efficiency
Ljung-Box +
others
Daily Not provided None >2,000
78 On the transaction cost of
Bitcoin
Kim 2017 Price Price dy-
namics
Bid-Ask
Spread Analy-
sis
Daily quandl.com Currency >250
(continued on next page)
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Table 2: Key characteristics of included quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Dep.
Var
Reason Selected
Methodology
Frequency Data Source Selected
Controls
N
79 Long-range correlations and
asymmetry in the Bitcoin
market
Alvarez-
Ramirez
et al.
2018 Correl Market
Efficiency
Detrended
Fluctuation
Analysis
Daily coindesk.com None 1,435
80 Informed trading in the Bit-
coin market
Fenga et
al.
2018 Price Info Effi-
ciency
Quantile Re-
gressions
Daily bitcoincharts Event 361
81 Informational efficiency of
Bitcoin - An extension
Tiwari et
al.
2018 Price Info Effi-
ciency
Centred Mov-
ing Average
Daily coindesk.com None 2,525
82 Time-varying long-term
memory in Bitcoin market
Yonghonga
et al.
2018 Price Price dy-
namics
Hurst Expo-
nent
Daily bitcoinaverage None 2,551
83 Price discovery of cryptocur-
rencies: Bitcoin and beyond
Brauneis
and Mes-
tel
2018 Price Price Dis-
covery
p-values and
Ljung-Box test
Daily coinmarketcap Other
crypto
>500
84 Long memory interdepen-
dency and inefficiency in
Bitcoin markets
Cheah et
al.
2018 Price Market
Efficiency
Exact Local
Whittle
Daily bitcoincharts None 1,057
85 Persistence in the cryptocur-
rency market
Caporale
et al.
2018 Price Market
Efficiency
R/S analysis
and fractional
integration
Daily coinmarketcap None >1000
86 The inefficiency of Bitcoin
revisited: A high-frequency
analysis with alternative
currencies
Sensoy 2018 Price Market
Efficiency
Permutation
entropy
5, 20,
30, 40
and 45
minutes
not stated None >15000
87 Chaos, randomness and
multi-fractality in Bitcoin
market
Lahmiri
and
Bekiros
2018 Price Market
Efficiency
Largest Lya-
punov ex-
ponent and
Shannon En-
tropy
Daily coindesk.com None 2,655
88 Long-range memory, distri-
butional variation and ran-
domness of Bitcoin volatility
Lahmiri et
al.
2018 Price Price
Volatility
GARCH Daily bicoinity Multiple
Bitcoin
Markets
>1,300
89 Informational efficiency of
Bitcoin - An extension
Tiwari et
al.
2018 Price Info Effi-
ciency
Centred Mov-
ing Average
Daily coindesk.com None 2,525
90 Time-varying long-term
memory in Bitcoin market
Yonghonga
et al.
2018 Price Price dy-
namics
Hurst Expo-
nent
Daily bitcoinaverage None 2,551
(continued on next page)
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Table 2: Key characteristics of included quantitative research
Paper Name Authors Year Dep.
Var
Reason Selected
Methodology
Frequency Data Source Selected
Controls
N
91 Semi-strong efficiency of
Bitcoin
Vidal-
Tomás
and
Ibañez
2018 Price Market
Efficiency
Event Study Daily Quandl None >2000
92 Adaptive market hypothesis
and evolving predictability
of bitcoin
Khuntia
and Pat-
tanayak
2018 Price Market
Efficiency
DL and GS Daily CoinDesk None >2000
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Table 3: Core research topics of the papers presented in Table 2
Core Research Topic Count
Bitcoin taxation 2
Bubble testing 1
Cryptocurrency Structure 18
Cybercrime 6
Diversification Benefits 11
Future of Digital Payments 1
Informational Efficiency 2
Legal 1
Market Distribution 1
Market Efficiency 26
Market Risk 1
Market Volatility 1
Overview of Legal Structure 1
Portfolio Diversification 1
Potential other uses for blockchain 1
Price Discovery 5
Price dynamics 12
Price Volatility 4
Product Attention/Social Media 2
Regulation 7
Table 4: Sources of data utilised in quantitative methods presented in Table 2
Data Source Count
Altcoin Charts 1
Apple App Store 1
Bicoinity 1
Bitcoin Core 1
Bitcoinaverage.com 2
Bitcoincharts.com 15
Blockchain.info 4
Brave New Coin Digital Indices 1
Coindesk.com 13
Coinmarketcap.com 5
Cryptocompare.com 1
Datastream 2
hu.berlin/crix 1
kaggle.com 1
Mt.Gov 1
Quandl.com 4
WinkDex.com 1
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Table 5: Gaps in the literature
Number Gap
1 Expand datasets and number of cryptocurrencies studied
2 Study the legal, economic and regulatory issues of cryptocurrencies
3 Asymmetrical information issues
4 Theoretical Development
5 Alternative potential benefits and uses of blockchain
6 Evaluate the benefits of cryptocurrencies separately, and not as one large asset class
7 Evaluate cryptocurrencies based on their use, rather than just their financial performance
8 Address the environmental challenges of cryptocurrencies
9 Evaluate the benefits of cryptocurrencies as an asset class part of a diversified portfolio
10 Ongoing study of cryptocurrencies since their behaviour is continually changing
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